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Abstract 
This paper aims to examine whether the economic and political reasoning behind 
Maastricht is consistent with earlier approaches to monetary integration. In doing so, it 
revisits the intellectual debate on monetary integration in Europe at different stages. It 
concludes that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as agreed at Maastricht reflected a 
compromise between two different but converging preferences, in the context of the 
experience of the European Monetary System (EMS) and other developments in national 
and European politics as well as in economic thought, on the role of monetary policy and 
institutions; the fall of the Berlin Wall may have added a new political dimension that 
might have made it easier to agree on the blueprint and on the calendar for the realisation 
of EMU. The various (political and economic) motivations for the convergence of 
initially different views on the role of monetary policy and successive interpretations of 
the objectives of EMU are discussed within the wider context of the process of European 
integration.  
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1. Introduction 
Until the end of the 1960s, the Bretton Woods system served the objectives of monetary 
coordination in Europe well (laid down in Articles 103 to 108 of the Treaty of Rome). The 
Monetary Committee was the only Community institution in the field of monetary 
coordination. The nature of monetary coordination was eminently “Atlantic”,2 as was the 
case until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 for common external and defence policies. It 
was difficult to conceive of any concrete actions in that field which did not have the dollar as 
a reference.3 
 The 1967 sterling devaluation however provided French President De Gaulle with an 
argument for denying entry into the European Community to the United Kingdom and the 
devaluation of the French franc greatly affected intra-European trade and the functioning 
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). As a result of the erosion of the dollar-gold 
standard, the Hague Summit of 1969 began discussing possible forms of European 
monetary cooperation and plans for a future monetary union.4 
 Following the Hague Summit, the European Community Economic and Finance 
Ministers discussed a series of national plans for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
put forward by Germany5, Belgium and Luxembourg. The European Commission also 
presented its own plan. There was a division between those who wanted a prior 
harmonisation of some economic policies (Germany, with the support of the Netherlands) 
and those who wanted to move on immediately to the creation of different monetary 
arrangements (Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Commission with the support of 
France, which did not present a plan). In March 1970, the Werner Committee was created. It 
presented its final report in October of the same year with a detailed calendar for achieving 
Economic and Monetary Union in three stages. The objective of EMU was subsequently 
approved by the Council but no agreement was reached on the need for common policy 
                                        
2 On the influence of “Atlantic standards” from 1880 until 1973, see Macedo (1996). According to Maes (2006), 
the Commission was the exception taking “the internal logic of the integration process” and not the international 
monetary system, as its framework of analysis. 
3 Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989).  
4 Prior to this there had been several initiatives by the European Parliament, such as the Van Campen 
Report published in April 1962, and by the European Commission, such as its October 1962 Action Plan, 
and the February 1969 Barre memorandum, which translated among other things into the creation of the 
Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the European Economic Community (EEC). 
5 Until 1990, “Germany” refers to West Germany only. 
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making and on the nature of common supranational institutions,6 and therefore no 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was convened to follow up on the idea. 
The idea of a common currency or rather simply the permanent fixing of intra-
European exchange rates had grown out of the need to maintain an environment of stable 
competition. An Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) also offered a means for 
isolating all the European economies from exchange rate volatility and serious 
misalignments. Such events could affect the macroeconomic stability of weak currency 
countries and the competitiveness of strong-currency countries, leading to protectionist 
pressures and/or trade barriers. Moreover, they could also jeopardise the functioning of 
the customs union (achieved before schedule by 1968) and the already delayed 
implementation of a common market7 and indeed of the entire European integration 
process. In fact, the more European common policies there were, the stronger was the 
need for fixed exchange rates in the EC. The CAP, based on the establishment of 
common prices for all Member States, could not work with permanent changes in intra-
European exchange rates without very complex interventions to maintain the original 
established prices. A European monetary union was by then already seen as the logical 
corollary of a European common market and any common policies.  
Since there was no agreement on the institutional design and objectives of an 
economic and monetary union in the EC, the idea had to wait for almost two decades before 
being implemented. Other circumstances, such as the end of the Bretton Woods system and 
the first oil crisis, of course exacerbated that conflict of preferences: Inflation differentials 
widened dramatically and so did (monetary) policy responses to those shocks.8 
 After the failure of the Werner plan, there were several attempts to limit exchange 
rate fluctuations between the various currencies of the EC Member States so that intra-
European trade and especially the CAP would not be affected: the “Snake in the tunnel”, an 
experience of joint fluctuation of European currencies (the intra-European fluctuations were 
limited to +/- 2.25 per cent) vis-à-vis the dollar, which lasted only for one year (from March 
1972 to April 1973); the “Snake out of the tunnel”, after the various European central banks 
                                        
6 Ungerer (1997: 114) refers to France’s rejection of an early commitment to the concept of common policy 
making and German and Dutch requests for more consideration of the supranational aspects of the Werner 
Report. 
7 As noted by Thygesen (1996), protectionist pressures in a monetarily fragmented system would include 
industrial subsidies in strong-currency countries.  
8 For an analysis of those circumstances, see Verdun (2000). 
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stopped defending the parities of their currencies in relation to the dollar and the experience 
of joint fluctuation after which a de facto Deutschmark area extending to the Benelux and 
the Nordic currencies was established. The failure of the snake was also marked by the 
lack of convergence of preferences. 
 The European Monetary System (EMS) appeared in March 19799 as an urgent 
political compromise which was only possible because of the way in which it was initially 
promoted in 1978: at the highest political level and “outside the routine framework for 
discussing such issues in the EC”.10 In contrast to the Jenkins proposal,11 which very 
much embraced the approach of the McDougall Report,12 it did not envisage any policy 
coordination outside the monetary area. Although the EMS was not presented as a device 
aimed primarily at reducing inflation (as argued by Della Posta, 2007), since otherwise 
the choice of symmetry would not have been made, (overcoming) different preferences 
about inflation may have already been a central issue in (and motivating) the Giscard-
Schmidt political initiative (compromise).13 Inflation differentials between Germany and 
other European countries had shown the incompatibility of different national policies / 
developments (preferences) and common exchange rate arrangements such as the Snake. 
Nevertheless, participants understood that they would eventually have to choose between 
floating (that is, too frequent realignments) and fixed exchange rates with a convergence 
of preferences regarding the inflation rate. Institutions could provide policy makers with 
effective constraints. 
 By the time of the Delors report in 1989, the EMS was already clearly perceived 
(almost exclusively) as an anti-inflationary / disciplinary mechanism. However, in the 
wake of the Werner Report,14 whose recommendations had been adopted as objectives of the 
European Community in March 1971, the Delors Report – or more precisely the Report by 
                                        
9 In the First Jean Monnet lecture at the European University Institute, the then President of the European 
Commission, Roy Jenkins, re-launched the idea of a new phase of European monetary cooperation and may 
have set the basis for the Franco-German initiative (Schmidt - Giscard d’Estaing) on which the EMS was 
built. 
10 Gros and Thygesen (1998: 35). See Ludlow (1982) for an earlier analysis of the making of the EMS and 
Gros and Thygesen for a brief history and detailed analysis of its functioning. 
11 Jenkins (1977).  
12 McDougall et al. (1977).  
13 Among the motivations for the creation of the EMS, however, Jenkins also included the need to reduce 
inflation. In the earlier famous All Saints’ Day Manifesto (Basevi et al., 1975) that proposed a parallel 
currency, the Europa, with constant purchasing power, the fight against inflation was also very much a 
preoccupation, and was clearly highlighted as a stated objective. 
14 Werner Committee (1970).  
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the Committee for Economic and Monetary Union15 – adopted a gradual strategy in the 
transition to a European single currency. The definition of Economic and Monetary Union 
entailed respect for the conditions established in the Werner Report: the irreversible 
convertibility of all currencies and the full integration of the financial system, as well as the 
elimination of the fluctuation margins and the irrevocable fixing of exchange rate parities. 
The IGC was convened at the end of 1990 and continued until the Maastricht 
summit. Its goal was to guarantee the irreversibility of the process of building up a true 
economic and monetary union (EMU). The single currency again constituted the logical 
corollary of the single market16 but was also the first step towards increased political 
integration – monetary affairs were again perceived as a powerful engine for further political 
integration.17 This time, however, there was a consensus on the main objectives and 
institutional design of EMU. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in the next section I present the 
two main views on what the objectives of Economic and Monetary Union should have been 
and how it should have been implemented; section 3 analyses how initial different and 
opposing views on European monetary integration and on the role of monetary policy did 
not allow for an earlier establishment of EMU (with the failed attempts of the Werner plan 
and the Snake). Section 4 discusses the political compromise found for the creation of the 
EMS and how that system changed in nature over the years. Section 5 addresses the 
convergence of preferences of the two main views on European monetary integration during 
the second phase of the EMS. Section 6 examines the exchange rate crisis of 1992/93. 
Section 7 analyses the compromise reached at Maastricht on the basis of the previous 
convergence of preferences. Section 8 offers some conclusions. 
 
 
2. The two main views on the monetary future of Europe 
 
From the beginning of the debate on Economic and Monetary Union there were 
two main divergent views (or camps) on how to coordinate monetary policies and on the 
                                        
15 Delors Committee – Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (1989). The Committee 
was created in June 1988 at the Hannover Summit and its report came out in April 1989. 
16 Emerson et al. (1990).  
17 Torres and Giavazzi (1993).  
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need to achieve monetary integration in Europe. The debate pitted the so-called 
monetarists, who thought that monetary integration would promote economic (and indeed 
political) convergence, against the so-called economists, who stressed the need for a 
higher level of coordination of economic policies and integration prior to the 
establishment of a monetary union, that is, for some prior convergence of economic (and 
necessarily political) integration.18 These divergent views amount to two different 
approaches on two distinctive levels:  
The first point of contention concerned the nature of the transition to EMU, i.e. 
whether it should be more immediate or more gradual; a second point of dispute centred 
around divergent preferences on the role and institutional design of monetary policy, 
namely on the degree of centralisation and independence of monetary policy required to 
guarantee price stability. 
Such a role and design were clearly not independent of the degree of economic 
and political integration which was necessary in order to share monetary sovereignty, 
which in turn conditioned the way in which the transition to EMU could be made.  
As far as the first level (views on the transition) was concerned, the so-called 
monetarists (notably France, Belgium and Luxemburg and eventually also Italy, whose 
position was less clear-cut) adopted a functionalist view of European integration insofar 
as they perceived monetary cooperation, such as the narrowing of fluctuation bands or 
mutual credit lines, as a means of bringing about economic and political integration, 
without surrendering too much of their political sovereignty. As for the second level 
(views on monetary policy), the building up of economic and monetary union would be 
very much an open ended strategy to solve problems as they would appear and one which 
contributed to a deeper step-by-step political integration. This approach to monetary 
integration corresponds very much to a functionalist view of European integration. 
                                        
18 Describing the controversy over the Maastricht convergence criteria, Wyplosz (2006) classifies these two 
old labels as bizarre, questioning the reasons behind them. In this paper I go beyond the established 
definitions of those two labels (see for instance Ungerer, 1997) and try to reinterpret the positions from the 
perspective of what happened during the experience of the EMS, and thus draw parallels with two other 
currents of opinion as far as the overall process of European integration was concerned. The label 
“monetarists” (not to be confused with the doctrine on the quantity theory of money) encompasses the view 
that a tight and unconditional agenda is needed for the creation of common monetary institutions, as an 
open-ended way not only of responding to the monetary problems of the moment but also of driving 
political integration, given that heightened economic integration and new institutions reflecting 
heterogeneous preferences would lead to a higher degree of political integration (compatible with a 
functionalist view). The “economists” may justify their label by advocating a prior convergence of 
economic developments and/or of preferences regarding a culture of (price) stability (compatible in a less 
obvious way with a federalist view). 
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On the other hand, the so-called economists (by and large the Germans and the 
Dutch) argued that economic convergence and close coordination of other policies such 
as fiscal and wage policies would have to come first. As for the second level (views on 
monetary policy), they would only agree to move on to Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) after making sure that there had been a prior convergence in terms of economic 
developments and/or the previous establishment of a federal institution with well defined 
objectives. This position can be described as a federalist view of European integration 
insofar as their proponents would advocate the creation of new common supranational 
institutions with clearly defined goals for which there was a need for prior agreement. 
At first glance, the requirement of a prior convergence in terms of economic 
developments might seem contradictory (as argued by Della Posta, 2007) with respect to 
an institutional approach setting up the appropriate rules for the automatic attainment of a 
non-inflationary environment that is also more conducive to long term growth. Of course 
the prior convergence of economic developments as a political requirement amounts very 
much to a step by step (gradualist) approach and does not necessarily ensure a genuine 
convergence of preferences nor the sustainability of new common rules.19 Only 
institutional arrangements, such as the rules governing the ECB, would guarantee that all 
EMU members abided by a common preference for low inflation for the entire eurozone. 
However, such a prior (entry) requirement, understood as a test for a genuine 
convergence of preferences, is compatible with a federalist view and the defence of new 
institutions with clearly defined political objectives (basically, a monetary constitution). 
Considered in the perspective of different but converging preferences, it may also be 
easier to comprehend the coherence of the different positions as far as EMU is concerned 
throughout recent decades and the rationale behind the compromise reached at 
Maastricht.20 
The Werner plan and the experience with the Snake clearly show that the 
preferences between the two camps were too different for a compromise to be possible. 
However, the creation of the EMS indicates some increased flexibility (in the context of 
re-launching Franco-German cooperation21) on the part of both camps, which boils down 
                                        
19 De Grauwe (1996).  
20 Torres (1996 and 2007); Wyplosz (2006).  
21 For different explanations of the importance of Franco-German cooperation throughout the process of 
monetary integration and on the implications of such integration and of the ensuing economic convergence 
of the two countries for that relationship, see Collignon (2004) and Jones (2002). 
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to the creation of a temporary and open-ended institution. This implied delaying 
discussions about preferences over the goals of monetary policy.  
The EMS was then possible (although with the opposition of the Bundesbank22) as 
a way to solve immediate problems (see below), leaving the door open for realignments 
whenever monetary policy goals (preferences) were not compatible. Eventually, during 
the second phase of the transforming EMS, when it became essentially a Deutschmark 
zone, preferences between the two camps converged significantly. This made it possible 
to agree on a blueprint for Economic and Monetary Union, with clearly defined goals to 
be implemented by a common federal institution.  
Again, in the transition to EMU another compromise was struck. On the one hand, 
the “monetarists” received a tight and quasi-irreversible agenda (with a very precise 
calendar) also in order to anchor post-reunification Germany to the European Union. On 
the other hand, the “economists” established the entry criteria and the stability and growth 
pact as what they saw as a guarantee for a prior and genuine convergence of preferences, 
or at least as a means for addressing the potential opposition of German public opinion to 
the loss of the Deutschmark. This compromise was clearly political but does reflect a true 
convergence of preferences over the years. 
This paper argues that, rather than distinguishing between the EMS and EMU in 
terms of Keynesian or monetarist (opposing and contradictory) theoretical foundations,23 
the different unsuccessful political attempts (Werner plan, Snake) and successful political 
compromises (EMS, EMU) can be explained in terms of convergence of preferences over 
time, tempered of course by the circumstances of each political and economic phase of 
European integration and the corresponding bargaining power of each camp.24  
 
3. Earlier plans for Economic and Monetary Union  
 
In the Werner report the main objective of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) seemed to be to achieve the political independence of Europe in monetary affairs.  
                                        
22 The Bundesbank feared that the arrangement could condition its very monetary policy and could not 
show as much flexibility as the German government, which also considered other political goals besides 
price stability. 
23 As in Della Posta, (2006 and 2007).  
24 This view may help us better to understand the political sustainability of EMU, as preferences might 
converge or diverge depending on its very functioning. See Torres (2007a and 2007b). 
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Conflicts over the course of monetary policy were already undermining the good 
functioning of the Bretton Woods system, with the US becoming an increasingly reluctant 
leader. The project of monetary unification in Europe envisaged by the Werner Report 
involved the creation of an area in which goods, services, people and capital would 
circulate freely and without competitive distortions and thereby reinforce the EC 
contribution to an economic and monetary equilibrium in the world.25  
When the Werner Report was written, the Bretton Woods system was still 
operational but the devaluation of the British pound in 1967 and, more importantly, the 
devaluation of the French franc in August 1969 had already greatly affected intra-
European trade and, in the latter case, the functioning of the CAP.26 Those 
preoccupations, which were subsequently very much at the basis of the more urgent 
decision to create the EMS, only partially explain the project of European monetary 
integration as outlined in the Werner Report: the apparent fragility of the international 
monetary system and the evolving discussions over its reform made it imperative for the 
EC to establish a coordinated position on a global level.27 
We can therefore conclude that the main motivations of the Werner Report 
involved the perceived need to improve the coordination of economic and monetary 
policies world-wide and in the European Community (EC) in order to ensure the 
implementation of a common market and the proper functioning of the CAP. 
By this stage, as far as Germany was concerned a European monetary union 
would have to have an independent European central bank basically modelled on the 
Bundesbank.28 In fact, as noted by the German negotiator on the Werner committee, a 
European monetary union would need to establish clear rules so that external 
commitments involving a reduction of the member states’ autonomy in economic policy 
should be made only if the necessary harmonisation or integration of economic policies 
could be ensured.29 This position would satisfy the requirements of other countries, 
                                        
25 Werner Committee (1970: 9).  
26 Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) and Gros and Thygesen (1998) provide for an excellent account of these 
events. 
27 See Ungerer (1997).  
28 Zimmermann (2004).  
29 See Zimmermann (2004) for a citation of the precise wording used by the German negotiator in the 
Werner committee, J. Schöllhorn, in his Memorandum on EMU, 23/4/7, 0PA-AA, IIIA1, vol. 590. 
According to Zimmermann, after making the initial proposal Chancellor Willy Brandt focused on 
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including in particular France, which would like to preserve more active monetary 
policies. In consequence, the Werner plan for an economic and monetary union did not 
progress.30 
 
4. The EMS as an open ended compromise 
 
Reflecting a functionalist approach to European integration and the perspective of 
the so-called monetarists (France, Belgium and Luxemburg), the EMS began to operate in 
1979. During the first years of its life it worked just as an adjustable exchange rate 
mechanism aiming at limiting exchange rate fluctuations but allowing for the 
compensation of inflationary differentials that would have affected the competitiveness of 
a country. This is why almost automatic exchange rate realignments were allowed during 
the first years of the EMS’ existence.  
 In fact, during a first phase, between 1979 and 1983-84, the EMS was still 
characterised if not by symmetry than at least by frequent realignments which would allow 
for the accommodation of inflation differentials through devaluations of the weaker 
currencies (their central parities) in order to compensate for the corresponding loss of 
competitiveness. From the mid-1980s however, and up until the exchange rate crisis of 
1992-93, the EMS essentially became an asymmetric mechanism, a Deutschmark area, with 
fewer (and smaller) realignments, which would allow only for the partial accommodation of 
inflation differentials.31 Starting from a mechanism of exchange rate stability (with many 
adjustments) the EMS became a disciplinary mechanism. 
This change in the nature of the EMS, from a symmetrical arrangement to an 
asymmetric arrangement anchored in the Deutschmark, was caused by a convergence of 
the preferences of policy makers and politicians from the different participating countries. 
Below I discuss two principal explanations for this convergence of preferences in favour 
of price stability vis-à-vis other objectives of economic policy.32 
                                                                                                                    
Ostpolitik, thereby allowing the Economics Ministry and the Bundesbank to represent the German view on 
EMU. 
30 See Gros and Thygesen (1998), Ungerer (1997) and Zimmermann (2004) for a thorough analysis of the 
failure of the Werner plan. 
31 See Torres (1987) for a more detailed analysis and a graphical representation. 
32 Another important factor involves the changes which occurred in international politics, namely with the so-
called conservative revolution, initiated by Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and by Ronald Reagan in 
the US and the consequent establishment of “supply-side economics” and monetarist doctrines. Those doctrines 
banned the use of stabilisation policies for structural purposes and favoured price stability over other goals of 
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5. The main factors contributing to the convergence of preferences in the EMS 
5.1 Changes in domestic and European policies and politics 
 
The first of these factors concerned two important policy and political changes, 
one in France and the other one in Italy.33 France under its first post-war socialist 
government had opted for counter-cyclical expansionary fiscal and monetary policies 
encompassing higher minimum wages, reduced working hours and several 
nationalisations. As a result, the franc was forced to devalue each year from 1981 to 1983 
against the Deutschmark. President Mitterrand had failed to go his own way and, inspired 
by his finance minister, Jacques Delors, decided to reshuffle his cabinet, substituting a 
policy of competitive devaluations for a policy of competitive disinflation – the “franc 
fort” policy was born. France also came to accept what it had not accepted in the 
compromise that established the EMS, namely a surrender of its monetary sovereignty 
and follow the anti-inflationary policy of the Bundesbank, re-launching at the same time 
the engine of Franco-German integration (now with Mitterrand and Kohl instead of 
Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing). Italy took a bit longer but in 1985, when the lira was 
forced to devalue again against the mark, the wage indexation mechanism, known as the 
scala mobile, was abolished with a view to breaking the wage-inflation spiral. This 
represented a true change of regime, which became possible thanks to a national 
referendum held in 1984.34 Italy and France would still carry out two general 
realignments in 1986 and 1987, but with much smaller devaluations against the 
Deutschmark, after which their currencies were pegged to the ECU and all the other 
                                                                                                                    
economic policy. Prior to these changes and to the projection at the highest political level of those economic 
doctrines, and in spite of the abandonment of the idea of a monetary union in Europe, the academic debate 
on monetary integration was revived with the end of the Bretton Woods system and in the aftermath of the 
first oil shock. A high point of that debate was the All Saints’ Day Manifesto (already mentioned above), 
published by The Economist on 1 November 1975 – the same day on which the Maastricht Treaty entered 
into force in 1993 – by a group of European economists (Basevi et al., 1975), proposing the introduction of 
a common currency, the ‘Europa’, and the discussion that the proposal precipitated. 
33 According to Quaglia and Maes (2004), the lack of convergence of France and Italy with Germany in the 
process of European monetary integration was mainly explained by the difficulties to accept a common and 
independent European central bank and by problems in achieving macroeconomic stability, respectively. 
34 For more details see Gros and Thygesen (1998: 82). 
 12
currencies participating in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS from 1987 
until the ERM crisis in 1992-93.35 
These policy and political changes in France and Italy and also in several other 
countries need to be put in the context of domestic political struggles between stability-
oriented national central banks and treasuries and non-stability oriented spending 
ministries and politicians constrained by the political business cycle. These domestic 
struggles can help us better understand the changes which occurred. Stability-oriented 
policy makers rightly anticipated that those changes would also transform the EMS into 
an external constraint – a guarantee of monetary, and hopefully budgetary, discipline. 
 
5.2 Changes in economic thought: A new theory of economic policy 
 
Second, there was also a revolution in economic thinking - the rational expectations 
revolution - consisting in the assumption that economic agents were rational (which led to 
the award of the Nobel Prize to Robert Lucas in 1995 precisely for having developed and 
applied rational expectations and by having thereby transformed the understanding of 
economic policy), drawing attention to the costs in terms of inflation and unemployment of 
the lack of credibility of policy makers in relation to economic agents (which led to the 
award of the Nobel Prize to Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott in 2004, for their analysis of 
the time inconsistency of economic policy). The profession’s recognition of the relevance 
of the study of institutions, and how they affect economic performance (as pioneered by 
Douglass North, Nobel laureate in 1993), and of non-cooperative games (as pioneered by 
John Harsanyi, John Nash and Reinhard Selten, Nobel laureates in 1994) also shows a 
growing consensus over the importance of adequate rules and well-designed institutions for 
economic performance.  
Governments, besides being subject to constraints over their lack of knowledge 
about the functioning of the economy, also work under explicit credibility and political 
constraints. As a result, policies are the outcome of the government's optimisation 
problem: the maximisation of a well-specified objective subject to these binding 
                                        
35 There was only a technical realignment in 1990 which involved the rebasing of the central rate for the lira 
that moved into a narrower fluctuation band. 
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constraints. This approach36 translates, in the literature, into a number of positive models 
of economic policy in alternative institutional settings. These different environments vary 
from monetary and/or fiscal regimes and reforms (which in general parallel rules versus 
discretion) to changes in government colour and organisation (elections, simple majority, 
multi-party coalitions, etc.) and determine the credibility and political constraints that 
policy makers face. Credibility constraints are related to the temptation of policy makers 
to deviate from pre-announced plans, without disagreement over the ultimate policy 
goals. Political constraints involve conflicts of interest over those goals. 
 Although the two aspects are in general separated for the sake of presentation, it is 
their interplay that forms the basis for the theory and practice of economic policy. 
Credibility literature stands by itself as a distinct body even without any particular focus 
on politics: it started with the initial work on time-inconsistency referred to above and 
gained shape with the seminal paper by Barro and Gordon37 on rules and reputation as 
possible solutions to that problem. Many developments of these ideas took place within 
the framework of game-theory and reputation models. The idea of binding political 
constraints stems from the political business cycle literature (where governments have 
incentives to behave opportunistically – basically in order to be re-elected and remain in 
power) and from the theory of public choice (where there are conflicting policy 
preferences among different interest groups). 
 The lack of a safe commitment technology without formal rules has led to 
normative prescriptions, resulting from positive models of economic policy. These 
ensuing recommendations deal with institutional (re-)design (such as the delegation of 
monetary policy to independent central banks, constitutional rules on balanced budgets, 
etc.) and not with specific policy rules; they aim to change political equilibria (the 
incentive constraints faced by policy makers) which may alter policy outcomes.  
 In the mid-1980s, the academic interest in new proposals for a European monetary 
union gained a new impetus thanks to the internationalisation of the profession in Europe, 
namely through newly established networks such as the London-based Centre for Economic 
Policy Research, whose macroeconomic group frequently brought together in different 
                                        
36 For a discussion on credibility and political constraints in the context of EMU see Torres (1992) and 
(2006). While credibility constraints were dealt with by the establishment of an independent European 
central bank with the primary objective of price stability, political constraints are more difficult to address 
and involve the question of the accountability of the monetary authorities (an issue that deserved more 
attention in the Werner Report than in the Delors Report, composed essentially of central bankers). 
37 Barro and Gordon (1983).  
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conferences and seminars economists and high officials from national central banks and 
treasuries and the European Commission. Academics (political economists) saw the context 
of an enlarged market and potential institutional reform in Europe as an excellent 
opportunity to study the role of institutions in economic performance from a political 
economy perspective.  
 The time inconsistency literature suggested that exchange rate realignments could 
undermine the anti-inflationary credibility of a country. The interaction of the academic 
world with policy makers proved to be very powerful in shaping a new consensus on the 
best rules for monetary policy in Europe, namely in favour of using the EMS as a 
disciplinary mechanism for high-inflation countries and as a way of enhancing central bank 
credibility, and moving opinion in favour of Economic and Monetary Union.  
 In this context, the paper presented by Giavazzi and Pagano in 1986 at the 
European University Institute stressed the usefulness of EMS discipline as a means of 
effectively reducing inflation with a lower cost in terms of output and unemployment.38 
Fixed exchange rates, unlike other policy targets, can easily be tracked by the private 
sector and easily implemented by the authorities. With a credible exchange rate peg to a 
strong currency (such as the Deutschmark), the monetary authorities of higher-inflation 
countries could drawn on the anti-inflationary reputation of the strong currency country 
(Germany) so as to strengthen the credibility of national institutions and modify the 
expectations of private agents. In this way the authorities of the higher-inflation countries 
raised the political costs of inflation because their anti-inflation commitment was 
constantly monitored by the private sector and any different behaviour would imply a 
self-inflicted loss of competitiveness, which thus made the peg credible. 
 As argued in previous studies,39 Giavazzi and Pagano’s contribution was one of 
the most influential academic contributions leading to the creation of a consensus (and 
epistemic communities) in favour of EMU. 
By the late eighties and early nineties a general consensus had been established 
among economists but also, in part thanks to the networks mentioned above, among policy 
makers (i.e. members of the monetary committee and national central banks and 
                                        
38 Giavazzi and Pagano (1998).  
39 Torres (2006 and 2007a). 
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treasurers which may have constituted an epistemic community40 in favour of sound rules 
to guarantee price stability), the private sector and eventually also politicians, on the need 
to radically change the attitude towards inflation. There was also a relative consensus 
among those actors on the powerful disciplinary and disinflationary role of the EMS. This 
was due to the fact that the EMS had changed in nature from a symmetrical monetary 
arrangement to a Deutschmark zone.41 
 
6. The exchange rate crisis of 1992/93 
 
Such a growing consensus may have contributed to the stability of the EMS 
between 1987 and 1992. There were no realignments, except for a technical adjustment of 
the lira to a narrow band of fluctuation in 1990, and policy makers got used to the idea of 
living in a system of irrevocably-fixed exchange rates.  
The EMS had worked relatively well with capital controls, making it possible for 
the “followers” of Germany to adjust their exchange rates (through a realignment of the 
central parities of their currencies). However, this was no longer possible following the 
creation of the Internal Market in 1992 and the consequent elimination of all capital 
controls. The end of capital controls, an efficiency objective of the Single Market 
Programme, brought with it the possibility of exchange rate speculation against all the 
currencies susceptible to devaluation. 
When a typical asymmetric shock such as German reunification occurred in 1990, 
policy makers and politicians remained firmly committed to fixed exchange rates in order 
not to lose credibility. A revaluation of the Deutschmark against all other currencies could 
have been the textbook answer to such an asymmetric shock. Yet the other EMS members 
                                        
40 See Haas (1992: 3) for a definition of epistemic communities. Collignon and Schwarzer (2003), who also 
provide an excellent discussion on how epistemic communities create consensus and a thorough discussion 
of the concept and the definition mentioned above, apply this concept to the private sector, namely to two 
important non-governmental organisations representing the views of the business and banking communities 
that took a very active role in favour of a European monetary union: the Giscard-Schmidt Committee for 
the Monetary Union of Europe (CMUE) and the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe (AMUE). 
See also Verdun (1999) for an application of the concept to the Delors Committee. 
41 According to Mundell (1994), the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) within the EMS in theory was 
symmetrical with respect to its member countries, but in practice the Deutschmark became the “inflation 
anchor” of the system. In my opinion, further developments of the theory strengthened (Torres, 1996 and 
2007a) the superiority of rules versus discretion although this is controversial (see Della Posta, 2007, for an 
opposite view) and a discussion beyond this paper, where I just discuss how the prescription of exchange 
rates and/or monetary rules led to the creation of a political consensus in favour of EMU and the 
compromise reached at Maastricht. 
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resisted that possibility, fearing a loss of the credibility gained over the previous years 
inside the EMS. 
Given the existence of free capital mobility, the markets could easily test the 
commitment of each one of the other EMS members regarding their degree of adherence 
to the German tight monetary stance. The British pound and Italian lira, which were 
considered by the markets to be strongly overvalued in real terms, were forced out of the 
system by two speculative attacks whilst all the other currencies remained in the system, 
although the EMS fluctuation bands had to be enlarged less than a year later.42  
Following the enlargement of the fluctuation bands, exchange rates remained 
rather stable within informal and rather narrow bands for most currencies (except for the 
pound and lira that had left the ERM), since there was no formal commitment to be tested 
by speculators. The enlargement of the fluctuation bands did not imply an abandonment 
of the anti-inflationary stance in most EU countries, as they maintained, and in some 
cases even accelerated, the pace of convergence with Germany in order to satisfy the 
approved nominal convergence criteria established in the Maastricht Treaty.43 
As a matter of fact, fixed exchange rates and the commitment to the Internal 
Market objective of liberalising all capital movements implied the end of any monetary 
policy autonomy for the “followers” of Germany. The only chance to hold on to any 
monetary sovereignty was to share it in a common institution such as a European central 
bank. 
 
7. The Maastricht gradualism 
  
 At Maastricht, all EU countries seemed to have come around to the view that a 
credible and sound counter-inflationary monetary constitution should be adopted 
(although not necessarily a European monetary constitution in the cases of the UK, 
Denmark and Sweden). As has been pointed out in the modern political economy 
                                        
42 For an account of this episode, according to which the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Kenneth 
Clarke, had a decisive role, see Collignon and Schwarzer (2003: 122). 
43 This is clear in the policy stances of most EU countries: France achieved lower inflation rates than 
Germany, Portugal substantially reduced its inflation rate during the exchange rate crisis, and in Italy (see 
Eichengreen and Ghironi, 1996) the government agreed with social partners in 1992 and 1993 to do away 
with still persisting ways of wage indexation. The monetary authorities of all EU countries, including those 
with an opt-out clause - i.e. the UK Denmark and Sweden - kept following anti-inflationary monetary 
policies after the exchange rate crisis of 1992-93 as part of their commitments to nominal convergence. 
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literature, joining a monetary union based on institutions that deliver price stability is 
probably the best way to implement such a strategy. 
 In that perspective, there would be a tendency for high inflation countries to gain 
more than low inflation countries by sharing their monetary autonomy in a common 
monetary institution. The problem therefore became that of motivating countries that 
already had credible monetary institutions and hence low inflation to share their monetary 
autonomy with recently converted higher inflation countries that might resort to their old 
(inflationary) habits. The reluctance of low inflation countries to associate with countries 
with no prior solid record on price and monetary stability is an offshoot of such concerns. 
This is why the German central bank was perceived as reluctant to embark upon the 
project of European monetary integration. It was also for this reason that the October 
1993 ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
made it possible for Germany to pull out of EMU if it could not deliver monetary 
stability. The Maastricht gradualism was justified on the grounds that the convergence of 
macroeconomic variables was a pre-condition for EMU and that time would be needed to 
set up new European monetary institutions. 
 EMU (like the Werner plan 20 years earlier) met with the reluctance of the 
Bundesbank to relinquish its powers to less solid European monetary institutions, with the 
corresponding ramifications for domestic politics in Germany. The idea that the adoption 
of a single currency should be accomplished swiftly rather than gradually was defended 
by the “monetarists” (especially France). The position of the “economists”, voiced by 
Germany’s foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher when he was also president of the 
EC General Affairs Council in 1988, seemed to agree on the need to complement the 
internal market with a European monetary union and a European central bank. They 
however also stressed the need for a prior agreement on the basic economic policy 
principles, the “ordnungspolitische Grundauffassungen”, of a monetary union: the 
existence of an autonomous European central bank whose policies would primarily aim at 
price stability and which would be free from any obligation to finance national or EC 
budget deficits.44 
 Although by the early 1990s most EU countries had agreed to most of these aims, 
not all of them were ready (i.e. had fulfilled the convergence criteria) for monetary union 
in 1999. Therefore, a variable geometry emerged as a possible approach to EMU that 
                                        
44 Ungerer (1997: 197).  
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would safeguard Germany's position. However, in the case of a multi-speed EMU, 
macroeconomic convergence would become even more difficult for the countries which 
were catching-up, since their exclusion from EMU’s third phase would automatically 
render them more vulnerable in the international financial markets. As a result, by the 
simple fact of being perceived as laggards, these countries could have experienced 
speculative attacks on their currencies that would distance them further still from the 
Maastricht entry requirements. To complicate matters, the core members might then 
become reluctant to enlarge the union.45 
 A multi-speed Economic and Monetary Union (or, a more extreme eventuality, 
the failure to establish EMU) could then imply a serious set-back in both the on-going 
process of monetary integration and the EU’s level of economic integration. The 
European exchange rate crisis of 1992-93 and the 1995 aftermath of the Mexican crisis 
provided good illustrations of this. Moreover, the internal market would be threatened if 
there were serious currency misalignments that would give rise to trade protectionism. 
This was a powerful argument in favour of resisting any delays to the transition to EMU 
too much. It was non trivial even for Germany46 and may have answered some of the 
reservations regarding EMU on the part of some German politicians (such as Edmund 
Stoiber and Gerhard Schröder).47 
 The Maastricht Treaty then established a calendar for the various stages of monetary 
integration and a set of conditions for the macroeconomic performance of future members of 
EMU, as well as a constitution for the future European monetary authority, the European 
Central Bank (ECB). 
 The first phase of monetary integration started well before the Treaty on European 
Union entered into force on 1 July 1990, with the liberalisation of capital controls.48  
 The second phase of monetary integration, whose interest and implications (potential 
instability) precipitated intense discussions during the elaboration of the Delors Report and 
the preparation of the Intergovernmental Conference that gave rise to the Maastricht 
                                        
45 See Alesina and Grilli (1994) for a formal analysis of this point. 
46 See Eichengreen and Ghironi (1996).  
47 As it is generally held that the Deutschmark might have appreciated substantially in the absence of EMU, 
the Euro may have also been perceived as advantageous for the German economy, namely for the car 
manufacturing and milk production sectors. 
48 Ireland, Portugal and Spain liberalised all capital controls before the 1992 deadline for the implementation of 
the Single Market while Greece relied on its derogation until 1995. 
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Summit, started in 1994, slightly later than the planned date (1 January 1994). A European 
Monetary Institute (EMI) was created, the precursor of the future European Central Bank, 
whose functions were outlined as accompanying the second phase of EMU (the meetings of 
the central bank governors of the countries of the Union started to take place in an institution 
of the European Union, the EMI headquarters in Frankfurt rather than in the headquarters of 
the Bank for International Settlements in Basle), that is, the facilitation of monetary 
cooperation between national central banks within the context of the ERM of the EMS and 
the promotion and supervision of the ECU, and preparation for the switch to the third phase 
of EMU – the creation of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the adoption 
of the common currency. The EMI was totally dependent on national central banks in 
budgetary terms and was staffed essentially by technical officers from those banks.  
 In addition to the technical preparation for the entire process of the creation of a 
central bank and a common currency, along with the necessary adaptations of national 
legislation (such as the statutes of the various central banks), the second phase of EMU also 
served to facilitate the increasing nominal convergence between member states. Therefore, 
“at the latest until 31 January 1996”, the EMI would define the necessary administrative, 
organisational and logistic framework for the ESCB to fulfil its tasks in the third phase 
(Article 109F(3) of the TEU). 
 The third phase of EMU was scheduled to start on 1 January of 1997 or at the latest 
on 1 January 1999 and to include those countries which had fulfilled the convergence criteria 
(Article 109J(3) and (4)). Any countries which did not satisfy the convergence criteria 
benefited from a derogation (Article 109K(1)). 
  
 7.1 The Maastricht convergence criteria as a political compromise 
 
 From a strictly economic point of view, waiting for the convergence of economic 
conditions to form a monetary union did not make sense. In fact, according to some authors, 
including for instance De Grauwe,49 the gradual approach inscribed in the Maastricht Treaty 
was nothing but a mechanism for delaying a political conflict between the German (i.e. 
Bundesbank) preferences not to share monetary sovereignty in EMU and the French 
preferences for a larger influence in European monetary affairs. In fact, from an economic 
viewpoint, it would make sense to allow high inflation and/or high debt countries into 
                                        
49 De Grauwe (1993).  
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EMU, provided that they had decided to participate in any case, so that it would be easier 
(in other words less costly) for them to reduce inflation and their public debt ratios. This 
is because the institutional differences, reflecting different preferences that imply 
different inflation and interest rates, would then disappear. Therefore, it would have been 
sufficient to guarantee an adequate institutional design of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) so that it could fulfil its task of assuring price stability and resist any pressures to 
accommodate problems in the area of public finance. 
 Nevertheless, convergence requirements were imposed in order to show the 
commitment to a culture of price stability. Criteria on the convergence of long-term 
nominal interest rates and ERM membership reflected the view that countries had to 
convince the markets of their determination to maintain an anti-inflationary stance.50 
Fiscal criteria were motivated by the idea that some prerequisites in the area of public 
finance would provide an incentive for fiscally-weak countries to avoid politically 
motivated deficits that could endanger, through the insolvency of the respective public 
sectors, the monetary stability of the entire union.  
 Rigid fiscal rules however, would not allow for tax-smoothing in the presence of 
transitory shocks, thus preventing governments from running adequate deficits during 
recessions.51 The idea that fiscal policy should play a greater role in cushioning the 
impact of shocks is best reconciled with the convergence requirements set out in the TEU 
(according to which national fiscal policies are constrained by binding rules), especially 
in the light of the fact that the level of public deficits in the early 1990s was extremely 
high throughout most of the countries of the European Union.52 The compromise 
involved a rapid leap forward to a one-speed monetary union entailing a number of entry 
requirements which would test whether (or show to those opposing EMU that) there was 
a “sufficient” prior convergence of preferences. 
 
 
 
                                        
50 Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006).  
51 Corsetti and Roubini (1993) provide an analysis of this trade-off between the benefits of fiscal rules and 
the possibility to use fiscal policy as a stabilisation instrument. They also provide a good survey of the 
political determinants of budget deficits. See also Jones (2007) for a discussion on the role of fiscal 
stabilisation in EMU. 
52 Interest rate payments on public debt amounted to 40 per cent of total household savings in Europe, 
hitting private investment and jeopardising the financing of social protection. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
 
The construction of EMU is to a large extent characterised by the convergence of 
preferences on the role of monetary policy and institutions, namely on the weight attached 
to the objective of controlling inflation. The Maastricht blueprint reflects a compromise 
between those converging views in the context of several changes that took place in the 
early to mid-eighties.53 Inflation is of course central to understanding the economic and 
political reasoning behind Maastricht, as the divide between anti-inflation and 
accommodating monetary authorities, which led to the failure of the Werner plan and of 
the first asymmetric arrangements of EC monetary cooperation (the Snake), further 
widened in the 1970s.  
 An exchange rate regime characterised by fixed parities and complete freedom of 
capital movements was not compatible with the maintenance of the monetary autonomy of 
national central banks. After the liberalisation of capital movements, and in the context of 
the changes which occurred in the International Monetary System (the end of the Bretton 
Woods system) and in the EMS, which was an initially open ended political compromise of 
different views about inflation and the role of monetary policy and institutions that 
transformed into a Deutschmark area, the only way of maintaining any influence over the 
course of monetary policy involved the pooling of sovereignty in the context of decisions 
taken by a common central bank. 
 The establishment of a timescale for the creation of EMU institutions was an 
expression of the determination to draw Germany into an increasingly broader participation 
in the European institutions and a leftover of the “monetarist” view. The gradualist approach 
to EMU and the established preconditions (convergence criteria) for the creation of a 
European central bank responsible for the monetary policy of the entire Union reflected, for 
its part, the pressures exerted by Germany for a delay in the transfer of its sovereignty to the 
ECB, and could also be considered as a remaining echo of the “economists” view. However, 
the plans for a monetary union envisaged by the Delors Committee would not have 
materialised, even less so in the more ambitious version enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, 
had the different preferences on inflation and on the role of monetary policy and institutions 
not genuinely converged during the 1980s.  
                                        
53 McNamara (1998) and Della Posta (2006) refer to the emergence of a monetarist consensus in Europe by 
the end of the 1980s, when the EMS experienced a period of success and prolonged stability. In this paper I 
have tried to explain the factors that led to a convergence of preferences in favour of price stability. 
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